2010 NOV -1 PM 4: 17 GREGORY W. SMITH (SBN 134385) LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY W. SMITH 9100 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 345E 2 Beverly Hills, California 90212 Tel: (310) 777-7894 Fax: (310) 777-7895 3 4 CHRISTOPHER BRIZZOLARA (SBN 130304) 1528 16th Street 5 Santa Monica, California 90404 Telephone: (310) 394-6447 Telecopier: (310) 656-7701 6 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff WILLIAM TAYLOR 8 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 11 12 WILLIAM TAYLOR, **CASE NO. BC422252** 13 Plaintiff, [Assigned to the Hon. John Shepard Wiley, Judge, Dept. "50"1 14 VS. OBJECTION TO, MOTION TO STRIKE. 15 CITY OF BURBANK, ET AL., AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT 16 CITY OF BURBANK AND ALLEGED Defendants. "DOE OFFICERS 11 AND 12" 17 **OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S** MOTION FOR DISCOVERY OF PEACE 18 OFFICER PERSONNEL AND OTHER 19 **RECORDS** 20 Date: November 4, 2010 Time: 8:30 a.m. 21 Dept.: 50 22 Action Filed: 9/22/09 23 24 25 26 27 28

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff William Taylor (hereafter "plaintiff") hereby presents the following objection to, motion to strike in its entirety, and response to defendant. City of Burbank and Alleged "Doe Officers 11 and 12"s' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery of Peace Officer Personnel and Other Records.

### INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant and alleged "Doe Officers 11 and 12"s' opposition should be dealt with for what is actually is - an untimely and improper motion for reconsideration under *C.C.P.* Section 1008 of this Court's previous unequivocal order that plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the production of the records at issue. Under the guise of allegedly representing the interests of unnamed (and plaintiff contends utterly fictitious) "Doe Officers 11 and 12", defendant has reasserted the identical grounds and arguments contesting the plaintiff's showing of good cause for the *in camera* inspection and production of documents that were previously expressly and properly rejected by this Court.<sup>1</sup>

Defendant has attempted to take advantage of the Court of Appeal's simple requests that:

a) the officers whose records are the subject of this Pitchess motion be given notice of this motion, and the opportunity to appear and be heard regarding the motion; and b) that the Court conduct an in camera inspection of the requested records and determine which of the records are relevant to this case. At this juncture, despite being given several months to do so, not a single officer has come forward to oppose the instant Pitchess motion, other than fictitious (and plaintiff contends imaginary) "Doe Officers 11 and 12", and defendant has failed once again to show any

Plaintiff directs the Court to the opposition filed by the defendant on April 8, 2010 to plaintiff's Pitchess motion, and to the "motion to strike" filed by on June 18, 2008 by defendant in regard to plaintiff's reply in support of plaintiff's Pitchess motion, which contain the identical contentions and arguments made by defendant and the purported "Doe Officers 11 and 12" in the instant opposition.

legitimate reason why this Court should not forthwith conduct an in camera inspection of the requested records sought by the motion and order the production of the relevant records to plaintiff.

### II. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION SHOULD BE STRICKEN

As set forth above, defendant's motion is an untimely and improper motion for reconsideration, since there are no new facts or law that justify defendant filling this opposition at this time. In order to attempt to avoid the restrictions of C.C.P. Section 1008, defendant purports to file the opposition on behalf of two unnamed and anonymous "Doe Officers 11 and 12." There is no authority that supports allowing any anonymous party to file any opposition to any Pitchess or other motion, and defendant cites to no authority to support that an individual whose records are allegedly being sought via Pitchess motion can oppose the Pitchess motion without revealing his or her identity.

As this Court is well aware, defendant and its current and/or former employees Jette and Rosoff have brought multiple ex parte applications and motions to seal the Pitchess motions seeking the records of Jette and Rosoff, all of which applications and motions which have to date been denied by the Court. Defendant, Jette, and Rosoff, despite being given months to do so, have failed to cite any apposite authority supporting that Pitchess motions or any papers relating thereto should be sealed, let alone that an officer should be allowed to file an opposition to a Pitchess motion anonymously.

Because these purported "Doe officers 11 and 12" have chosen to appear anonymously, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether they have any legitimate privacy rights in regard to any of the information or documents sought by this motion. How can the Court possibly engage in weighing the alleged privacy rights of these fictitious officers against the rights of the plaintiff to obtain the information and documents necessary to establish the truth in this litigation,

as the Court is required to do when ruling on a privacy objection, if the Court has not even been advised of the identity of the alleged person whose alleged privacy right is at stake? How is the plaintiff not unduly prejudiced by this intentional failure by the defendant and by purported "Doe Officers 11 and 12" to identify these officers so that plaintiff can set forth why their specific privacy rights are not impacted by the instant motion, and/or why their alleged privacy rights must yield in regard to plaintiff's right to obtain the information and documents sought by the motion?

Plaintiff objects to the entirety of the opposition filed by the alleged "Doe Officers 11 & 12" on the basis that there is no authority allowing any person to oppose a Pitchess or any other motion anonymously, and that therefore the entire opposition is a pleading which was not drawn in conformity with California law and should be stricken in its entirety pursuant to *C.C.P.* Sections 435 and 436.

C.C.P. Section 436(b) provides in pertinent part:

"The court may upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon such terms it deems proper:

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with laws of this state, the court rule, or any order of the court."

Here, the instant motion by "Doe Officers 11 and 12" is not "drawn or filed in conformity with laws of this state, the court rule, or any order of the court", and should be stricken in its entirety.

# II. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY THIS MOTION, AND ANY CONTENTION TO THE CONTRARY IS ILLOGICAL AND UNSUPPORTED

First, defendant again argues, as it expressly previously argued, that plaintiff "has the records sought, and for which the statutorily-required good cause showing was made, in the Pitchess motion." (Opp. 1: 15 - 16.) However, the good cause showing that was made was for the production of the entire internal affairs files regarding the alleged use of excessive force in regard to the Portos Bakery robbery investigation, and not simply the records which defendant

has unliaterally declared are the records regarding the investigation of plaintiff. Defendant has produced a mere handful of documents that it contends supports its defense in this matter, while admitting that voluminous additional records exist that are directly relevant to the allegations that excessive force was utilized by BPD personnel, including BPD Lt. Omar Rodriguez, in regard to the investigation of the Portos Bakery robbery. Plaintiff contends that no excessive force was utilized in connection with the investigation of the Portos Bakery robbery, and that therefore it was and continues to be impossible for plaintiff to have obstructed any investigation into such claims of excessive force. Indeed, the defendant itself has admitted that it determined in its initial internal affairs investigation (BPD IA 4-26-08-1) of the allegations of excessive force regarding the investigation of the Portos Bakery robbery that the allegations were unsubstantiated. (Opp. 3: 28-4: 5.) Obviously, plaintiff is entitled to the production of the entire internal affairs investigation 4-26-08-1 since that investigation supports plaintiff's contentions that no excessive force was utilized, and that therefore it was and continues to be impossible for plaintiff to have participated in any alleged "cover-up" of the use excessive force.

Defendant next contends that "significant new information about the purported misconduct during the Portos Robbery Investigation was brought to the attention of the BPD (specifically, a BPD officer who witnesses the use of force as a witness), and dozens of internal affairs investigations (the "2009 IA Investigation") were commenced by an outside investigator, James Gardiner, under Master Investigation No. IA 3-16-09." (Opp., 4: 6 - 10.) Once again, plaintiff is obviously entitled to the production of all information and documents regarding this alleged "significant new information about the purported misconduct during the Portos Robbery

The use of the term "purported" by defendant in its opposition is significant, since even the defendant is unwilling to unequivocally state to this Court that any misconduct occurred during the Portos Robbery investigation.

Investigation", since it is this information that is being relied upon by defendant to support its spurious claims of misconduct against plaintiff.

Defendant next makes the illogical and nonsensical argument that plaintiff should not be entitled to the production of records regarding the "dozens of investigations" into the allegations of excessive force in regard to the Portos Robbery, on the basis that these investigations involved allegations of:

- a) excessive use of force by officers (Opp., 4: 18 19) other than Lt. Rodriguez, which information is obviously relevant since if defendant determined that excessive force was used in regard to the Portos Robbery, then the fact that other officers were alleged to have used excessive force that was "covered up" is directly relevant to plaintiff's contentions that he was treated in a disparate manner for his alleged involvement in the matter, and as evidence that defendant's claim that plaintiff engaged in obstruction of the original internal affairs of Portos Robbery investigation is simply a sham and a pretext for defendant retaliating against plaintiff for engaging in protected whistleblowing and FEHA activities;
- b) for other officers failing to report misconduct of other officers during the Portos Robbery investigation or taking steps to deter other officers from reporting the misconduct (Opp., 4: 20 22), which information and documents again are expressly relevant to plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment and pretext as set forth above; and
- for being untruthful when questioned about what they observed during the Portos Robbery Investigation (Opp., 4: 22), which information and documents again are expressly relevant to plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment and pretext as set forth above.

Thus, defendant itself admits in its ill-conceived argument that the information and documents which it admits have not been produced to plaintiff are directly relevant to the matters directly at issue in this case, including, *inter alia*: 1) Was excessive force utilized in the

investigation of the Portos Robbery; 2) Who, if anyone, used such alleged excessive force; and 3) Who, how, and in what specific manner was the investigation allegedly obstructed by BPD officers "failing to report misconduct", failing to deter misconduct", or "being untruthful" during the initial internal affairs investigation", and what discipline, if any was given to such officers? If other officers engaged in misconduct more egregious than that alleged to have been committed by plaintiff and were not terminated, or if defendant protected certain officers (including former Chief Tim Stehr and others directly involved in the original internal affairs investigation), by failing to charge such officers with misconduct or properly investigate them, then such information and documents are expressly relevant to plaintiff's claims that he was subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activities, and that defendant's claim that plaintiff was terminated for "obstructing" the initial internal affairs investigation will be revealed for what it truly is - a sham and pretext for retaliation.

Thus, defendant, by its own admission, has not produced to plaintiff "dozens of investigations" regarding other officers who were alleged to have engaged in "excessive force", "failing to report misconduct", failing to deter misconduct", or "being untruthful" during the initial internal affairs investigation", all of which information and documents are directly relevant to plaintiff's contentions of retaliation in this matter.

III. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT BECAUSE IT FOLLOWED THROUGH ON ITS NOTICE OF INTENT TO TERMINATE PLAINTIFF AND HAS NOW TERMINATED PLAINTIFF IS A GROUND FOR DENYING THE INSTANT MOTION IS EQUALLY ILLOGICAL AND UNSUPPORTED

This Pitchess motion was granted on July 12, 2010. At the time of the hearing of the Pitchess motion, plaintiff had presented uncontradicted evidence to this Court that on or about January 21, 2010, plaintiff had been placed on involuntary leave by the BPD for specious and unfounded allegations of misconduct in regard to his involvement with BPD Internal Affairs file number 04-26-08-1, and that thereafter, on or about March 31, 2010, plaintiff was served by

defendant with a Notice of Intent to Terminate plaintiff for allegedly interfering with and obstructing BPD Internal Affairs file number 04-26-08-1.

Defendant now makes the spurious claim that because plaintiff had not yet been terminated by the defendant at the time of the filing of the previous Pitchess motion that plaintiff's showing of "good cause" for the production of the requested records was inadequate. Simple logic dictates otherwise. If the Court believed that there was good cause for the production of the information and documents when plaintiff was merely being threatened with termination, then quite obviously there is good cause for the production of the information and documents after plaintiff has actually been terminated. As defense counsel is well aware, plaintiff has filed amended charges with the DFEH and an amended governmental claim with the City of Burbank, the administrative prerequisites for filing a amended complaint in this matter to add termination to the ever growing list of adverse actions perpetrated upon plaintiff by defendant for engaging in protected activities. Defense counsel is also well aware that counsel for plaintiff has requested defense counsel to stipulate to plaintiff filing an amended complaint in this matter to add the additional adverse action of termination, which defense counsel has apparently delayed responding to in order that defendant could assert its current specious argument.

Defendant's current assertion is nothing more than a further delaying tactic intended to further obstruct and delay discovery and the prosecution of this matter, and should be summarily rejected by this Court.

V. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS OF OTHER OFFICERS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN MISCONDUCT REGARDING THE PORTOS ROBBERY INVESTIGATION ARE IRRELEVANT IS UNFOUNDED

As set forth above, the "dozens of investigations" of the Portos Robbery regarding other officers who were alleged to have engaged in "excessive force", "failing to report misconduct", failing to deter misconduct", or "being untruthful" during the initial internal affairs investigation",

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27 28 are all information and documents are directly relevant to plaintiff's contentions of retaliation in this matter. Indeed, the Court already determined that such investigations were relevant, and defendant's current opposition is simply an untimely and improper attempt to re-litigate this issue which has already been ruled upon by this Court.

Further, defendant's attempt to distinguish these other investigations as "investigations of criminal misconduct" rather than "internal affairs misconduct" is a distinction without a difference. Indeed, the fact that BPD officers were criminally investigated for having engaged in "excessive force", "failing to report misconduct", failing to deter misconduct", or "being untruthful" during the initial internal affairs investigation", and the actions, if any taken against such officers by defendant and others, is directly relevant to plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment and retaliation for engaging in protected activities, since plaintiff has never been charged with or convicted of any crime in connection with any matter, let alone the internal affairs investigation of the Portos Robbery Investigation. If other officers were subject to criminal investigation, arrest, and/or prosecution, and the BPD treated such officers more favorably than plaintiff, then obviously such conduct would assist in plaintiff establishing his claims of retaliation. Further, if the BPD itself failed to criminally charge or prefer charges against BPD officers who engaged in "excessive force", "failing to report misconduct", or failing to deter misconduct", relating to the criminal investigation regarding the Portos Bakery Investigation, then such evidence would assist plaintiff in demonstrating that the adverse employment actions taken against him in regard to similar matters were simply a sham and a pretext for retaliation.

## VI. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THERE ARE "OTHER MEANS TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION AT ISSUE" IS UNFOUNDED

Defendant next contends that are "less intrusive means" to obtain the information at issue, including "depositions" or "other avenues". Defendant fails to specify which depositions would provide plaintiff with such information, and fails to set forth that it would allow any witnesses to

 testify about the information and documents sought by this motion unless and until the Court orders the production of such information and documents pursuant to this motion. As this Court is well aware, defendant has gone to great lengths to oppose plaintiff from obtaining the information and documents sought by this motion. For defendant to suggest that it will simply sit silently by as the proverbial "potted plant" when plaintiff's counsel attempts to question Mr. Gardiner or anyone else regarding these investigations is of course simply nonsensical.

Defendant can be expected to and will no doubt object pursuant to *Penal Code* 832.5, 832.7, and *Evidence Code* Section 1040, et seq., and instruct any deponent not to answer any questions regarding these matters and not to provide the information or documents sought by this motion to plaintiff.

In regard to the other "avenues" available to plaintiff, defendant fails to specify what those avenues might be. Absent "x-ray" vision or "psychic revelations", plaintiff has no way of obtaining the requested information and documents from any source other than via the instant Pitchess motion.

### VII. DEFENDANT'S "HODGE-PODGE" OF OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE UNFOUNDED

Defendant also continues to make the same tired arguments that were previously rejected by the Court, including that plaintiff was required to identify the officers whose records are the subject of this motion. The Court of Appeal and this Court already rejected that argument by ruling that the defendant, who knows the identities of the officers who were the subject of the internal affairs investigations at issue, were required to give notice to such officers of this motion as defendant was and is required to do.

Further, as this Court is well aware, when plaintiff's counsel did specifically identify Lt. Jay

Jette and Lt. Eric Rosoff and provided a detailed description of the records sought in subsequent

Pitchess motions, both defendant and counsel for Jette and Rosoff vehemently objected and filed

1 EXECUTED at Beverly Hills, California on October 29, 2010. 2 3 Selma I. Francia 5 6 SERVICE LIST 7 WILLIAM TAYLOR v. CITY OF BURBANK 8 LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CASE NO. BC 422 252 9 Christopher Brizzolara, Esq. 10 1528 16th Street Santa Monica, California 90404 11 (By Electronic Mail Only) 12 13 Kristin A. Pelletier, Esq. Burke Williams & Sorenson LLP 14 444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, California 90071-2953 15 16 Dennis A. Barlow, City Attorney Carol A. Humiston, Sr. Asst. City Atty. 17 Office of the City Attorney City of Burbank 18 275 East Olive Avenue Post Office Box 6459 19 Burbank, California 91510 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28